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This article argues that the New Zealand torts of giving publicity to private 
information and intruding upon solitude and seclusion would better reflect the true 
nature of the privacy interest if the requirement that any alleged privacy interference 
be “highly offensive to an objective reasonable person” were abandoned. Courts should, 
instead, determine what is prima facie private by reference to the plaintiff ’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in respect of the information or activity in question. There are 
three main reasons for this: first, the high offensiveness test operates in a manner which 
is both uncertain and unpredictable; second, New Zealand courts applying the high 
offensiveness test have taken too narrow a view of the nature of privacy harms; and 
third, the test is unnecessary.
* Reader in Law, Victoria University of Wellington. I would like to thank 
Marcin Betkier, Victoria University of Wellington, for his careful copy-
editing assistance. I take full responsibility for all content.
2 
 
Moreham, Abandoning the “High Offensiveness” Privacy Test
I. Introduction 
II. The  High Offensiveness Test in New Zealand Law
III. Doubts About the High Offensiveness Test
IV. Why the High Offensiveness Test Should  Be Abandoned 
A. Lack of Principle in the Application of the High Offensiveness Test
B. Taking Too Narrow a View of Privacy Harms
C. The High Offensiveness Test is Unnecessary
V. Conclusion
I. Introduction
The common law protection of privacy in the Anglo-Commonwealth has blossomed in the last fifteen years. New Zealand and Ontario 
have recognised torts both of giving publicity to private facts and of 
intrusion into solitude and seclusion and in England and Wales, the tort 
of misuse of private information has emerged from within the breach of 
confidence. Two main approaches to ascertaining what is private have 
emerged from these developments. On the one hand, courts applying 
the English misuse of private information tort focus on the plaintiff’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy (which in turn determine whether the 
plaintiff’s right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights1 is “engaged”) and on any competing 
public interest in the material. On the other hand, there is the more 
complex Ontarian and New Zealand approach of asking not just whether 
the information or activity is private — which is usually determined 
by reference to reasonable expectations of privacy — but also whether 
the intrusion or publicity in question would be highly offensive to an 
objective reasonable person.
This article will argue that the first of these approaches — determining 
what is private by reference to reasonable expectations of privacy — is 
better. It does so by highlighting the many shortcomings of the operation 
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 art 8 (entered into force 3 September 
1953).
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of the high offensiveness requirement in New Zealand law and by 
contrasting it with the simpler English approach. The article begins by 
explaining both the rationales for and doubts about the New Zealand 
high offensive test. Three reasons for abandoning the requirement are 
then given. First, the relative lack of principle governing the application 
of the high offensiveness test makes it uncertain and unpredictable. 
Second, where principles have been developed, courts have taken too 
narrow a view of the nature of privacy harms (which in turn obfuscates 
the dignity and autonomy interests at heart of the privacy action). Third, 
the article shows that the high offensiveness test is unnecessary.
II. The High Offensiveness Test in New Zealand 
Law
The New Zealand privacy torts have at their heart ideas of retreat and 
inaccessibility. They protect people’s ability to remove themselves from 
the world and to keep certain information to themselves; in other words, 
to carve out a realm in which they can choose, on their own terms, the 
extent to which they are accessed by others. As Justice McGrath said 
(citing this author) in the Supreme Court case of Brooker v Police,2 privacy 
is therefore an aspect of human autonomy and dignity which protects 
against unwanted access to one’s physical self and private information.3 
Justice Tipping agrees. In the leading New Zealand Court of Appeal 
decision, Hosking v Runting,4 he says:
Privacy is potentially a very wide concept; but, for present purposes, it can 
be described as the right to have people leave you alone if you do not want 
some aspect of your private life to become public property. Some people seek 
the limelight; others value being able to shelter from the often intrusive and 
debilitating stresses of public scrutiny. … It is of the essence of the dignity 
2. [2007] NZSC 30.
3. Ibid at para 123, citing Lord Hoffmann in Campbell v MGN Ltd, [2004] 
UKHL 22 at para 50 [Campbell HL] and citing N A Moreham at para 
253 in “Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical 
Analysis” (2005) 121:4 Law Quarterly Review 628 at 640–41. See also 
ibid (Thomas J’s description of the home as a “sanctuary”, a place “to 
retreat or repair to” at para 257).
4. [2004] NZCA 34 [Hosking].
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and personal autonomy and well-being of all human beings that some aspects 
of their lives should be able to remain private if they so wish. Even people 
whose work, or the public nature of whose activities make them a form of 
public property, must be able to protect some aspects of their lives from public 
scrutiny.5
New Zealand appellate courts first recognised tortious protection of 
these privacy interests in 2004 in the Hosking case just mentioned.6 In 
that case, a television presenter and his former wife (acting on behalf 
of their 18 month old children) sought to prevent a women’s magazine 
from publishing photographs of the children being wheeled down a busy 
Auckland shopping street in a push chair by their mother. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the photographs breached the children’s privacy and, given 
the celebrity of the first plaintiff, potentially jeopardised their safety. All 
five judges agreed that there was no breach of privacy in the circumstances 
(primarily because the photographs were of an innocuous event which 
took place in public), but three of the five nonetheless held that there was 
a tort of giving publicity to private facts in New Zealand.
In the more widely cited of the two majority judgments, Justices Gault 
and Blanchard held that the publicity tort has two main requirements. 
The plaintiff, first, has to establish the existence of facts in respect of which 
5. Ibid at paras 238–39. These views are echoed elsewhere in the common 
law world. For example, in an oft-cited passage from the leading English 
privacy tort case of Campbell HL, supra note 3 Lord Hoffmann said that 
“the protection of human autonomy and dignity — the right to control 
the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to 
the esteem and respect of other people” at para 51. Blatz CJ similarly says 
in the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Lake v Wal-mart Stores Inc (1998), 
582 NW (2d) 231 (Minn Sup Ct (US)) that: “The right to privacy is an 
integral part of our humanity; one has a public persona, exposed and 
active, and a private persona, guarded and preserved. The heart of our 
liberty is choosing which parts of our lives shall become public and which 
parts we shall hold close” at 235. 
6. Hosking, supra note 4. The tort had previously been recognised in 
a handful of first instance decisions including Tucker v News Media 
Ownership Ltd, [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (HC) [Tucker]; Bradley v Wingnut 
Films Ltd, [1993] 1 NZLR 415 (HC) [Bradley]; P v D, [2000] 2 NZLR 
591 (HC) [P v D].
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there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and second, that publicity was 
given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to 
an objective reasonable person.7 Gault and Blanchard JJ made it clear that 
the first requirement — that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy — is designed to determine whether the information in question 
was private. Under the heading “Private Facts”, they explained (citing 
Chief Justice Gleeson in the Australian High Court case of Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd)8 that there is no 
bright line between what is public and private but that:
Certain kinds of information about a person, such as information relating 
to health, personal relationships, or finances, may be easy to identify as 
private; as may certain kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying 
contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to be 
meant to be unobserved.9
The third member of the majority, Tipping J, agreed that whether there 
is a reasonable expectation of privacy depends on social mores, stating 
that the word “reasonableness” plainly imports into the privacy tort an 
enquiry into “contemporary societal values” in respect of the matter at 
hand.10 Gault and Blanchard JJ took account of a range of factors in 
deciding that the children had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
case including the plaintiffs’ location, the nature of the activity depicted, 
public accessibility of the “facts” which the photograph conveyed (which 
they said, were the existence of the twins, their age, and the fact that the 
parents were separated), and the plaintiffs’ particular attributes including 
the fact that they were children and that they had a celebrity parent.11
Importantly for the purposes of this article, according to Gault 
and Blanchard JJ, but not Tipping J, a plaintiff seeking to establish an 
actionable breach of privacy also has to satisfy a second test. He or she 
7. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 117.
8. [2001] HCA 63 [Lenah].
9. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 119 citing ibid at para 42.
10. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 250. 
11. Ibid at paras 120–24, per Gault and Blanchard JJ and at para 260, 
Tipping J also took account of the plaintiffs’ location and his assessment 
of likely societal attitudes to the image.
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has to show that publicity was given to the facts in question which would 
be highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.12 The inspiration 
for this came particularly from three sources:13 the United States tort of 
giving publicity to private life (as articulated in the Restatement of the 
Law of Torts (Second));14 Gleeson CJ’s statement in Lenah that “[t]he 
requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities 
is in many circumstances a useful practical test of what is private”;15 and 
the English Court of Appeal’s application of the high offensiveness test 
in Campbell v MGN Ltd16 (which, as discussed below, was subsequently 
overruled by the House of Lords).
Gault and Blanchard JJ make it clear that the point of the high 
offensiveness test is to ensure that trivial claims are excluded from the 
reach of the publicity tort. They said that although a rights-based action 
like breach of privacy would usually be actionable irrespective of “the 
seriousness of the breach”, “it is quite unrealistic to contemplate legal 
liability for all publications of private information”.17  It would be “absurd” 
they said “to consider actionable merely informing a neighbour that 
one’s spouse has a cold”:18 rather “[b]y living in communities individuals 
necessarily give up seclusion and expectations of complete privacy”.19 
They go on to explain that the action should only be concerned with 
12. Ibid at para 117.
13. Ibid at para 126.
14. William L Prosser, John W Wade & Frank J Trelease, Restatement (Second) 
of Torts (Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1977) (which says that 
the publicity tort requires a plaintiff to show that “the matter publicised 
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public” at § 652D) [Restatement of 
Torts]. Early High Court decisions recognising the right to privacy in New 
Zealand were also heavily influenced by US law; see e.g. P v D, supra note 
6 at paras 33–34 and Bradley, supra note 6 at 423 et seq.
15. Lenah, supra note 8 at para 42.
16. [2002] EWCA Civ 1373 [Campbell CA].
17. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 125.
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
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“widespread publicity of very personal and private matters”20 and that:
publicity, even extensive publicity, of matters which although private, are 
not really sensitive should not give rise to legal liability.  The concern is with 
publicity that is truly humiliating and distressful or otherwise harmful to the 
individual concerned.  The right of action, therefore, should be only in respect 
of publicity determined objectively, by reference to its extent and nature, to be 
offensive by causing real hurt or harm.21
Finally, they stressed that the high offensiveness test relates to “the 
publicity” and is not part of the test of whether the information is 
private.22
Although there has always been doubt about the desirability of this 
separate highly offensive publicity requirement, Gault and Blanchard 
JJ’s approach has been consistently applied in subsequent first instance 
decisions.23 Importantly, this includes the 2012 case of C v Holland24 in 
which New Zealand’s second privacy tort — the tort of intrusion into 
seclusion — was first recognised.25 In that case, a woman successfully 
sued her flatmate for damages after he videoed her through a hole in 
the ceiling while she was having a shower. Proceedings were brought to 
establish the preliminary issue of “whether invasion of privacy of this 
type, without publicity or the prospect of publicity, is an actionable tort 
in New Zealand”.26 Justice Whata held that it was, regarding the tort of 
intrusion into seclusion as “entirely compatible with, and a logical adjunct 
to, the Hosking tort of wrongful publication of private facts”.27 Whata J 
20. Ibid [emphasis added].
21. Ibid at para 126.
22. Ibid at para 127.
23. See e.g. Andrews v Television New Zealand Ltd, [2009] 1 NZLR 220 
(HC) [Andrews]; Faesenkloet v Jenkin, [2014] NZHC 1637 [Faesenkloet]; 
Brown v Attorney-General (Invasion of Privacy), [2006] NZAR 552 (DC) 
[Brown].
24. [2012] NZHC 2155 [Holland].
25. Ibid. The existence of the seclusion tort in New Zealand has been 
implicitly accepted in a handful of cases since, including in the Court of 
Appeal in Graham v R, [2015] NZCA 568 at para 22 et seq.
26. Holland, supra note 24 at para 1. (The case settled before the substantive 
hearing took place.)
27. Ibid at para 75.
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held that the New Zealand intrusion tort has four key requirements:
(a) An intentional and unauthorised intrusion;
(b) Into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs);
(c) Involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
(d) That is highly offensive to a reasonable person.28
A legitimate public concern in the “information” may provide a defence.29
Whata J’s formulation of the intrusion into seclusion tort was once 
again heavily influenced by North American jurisprudence, this time by 
both the US and new Ontarian intrusion torts.30 In Whata J’s view, it 
was important to develop the requirements of the action consistently 
with those actions so that the New Zealand torts could benefit from the 
guidance which North American authority provides. He also stressed 
the need to ensure that the “content” of the intrusion tort is consistent 
with domestic privacy law and principles.31 Whata J therefore preferred 
his four-part approach to the one-step English reasonable expectation 
of privacy test, holding that the English approach “is not sufficiently 
prescriptive”32 and that the conflict between the right to seclusion and 
other rights and freedoms is “very significant” and demands “a clear 
28. Ibid at para 94.
29. Ibid at para 96. 
30. Ibid at paras 11–17, 94. According to Restatement of Torts, supra note 
14, “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject 
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person” at § 652B. The question of 
whether there is an intrusion upon seclusion is determined by reference 
to the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation privacy in respect of the place 
or matters intruded upon (see Shulman v Group W Productions, Inc, 18 
Cal (4th) 200 (Cal Sup Ct (US) 1998)) [Shulman]. According to Jones v 
Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 [Jones], a plaintiff seeking to establish the Ontarian 
tort of seclusion must show “(1) an unauthorised intrusion; (2) that the 
intrusion was highly offensive to the reasonable person; (3) the matter 
intruded upon was private; and (4) the intrusion caused anguish and 
suffering” at para 56.
31. Holland, supra note 24 at para 94.
32. Ibid at para 97.
9(2018) 4 CJCCL
boundary for judicial intervention”.33 In his view, the high offensiveness 
test sets a “workable barrier to the unduly sensitive litigant”.34
III. Doubts About The High Offensiveness Test
In spite of its consistent application in first instance decisions, the 
desirability of a separate high offensiveness test in New Zealand law has 
always been a matter of contention. Significantly, Tipping J did not see 
any need for it in Hosking. Although he agreed with Gault and Blanchard 
JJ that “relatively trivial invasions of privacy should not be actionable”35 
and that “it will always be necessary for the degree of offence and harm to 
be substantial”,36 in his view the separate high offensiveness requirement 
set the bar for recovery too high and was unnecessary. This was because 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test could be relied on to exclude 
unmeritorious claims:
I would myself prefer that the question of offensiveness be controlled within 
the need for there to be a reasonable expectation of privacy. In most cases 
that expectation is unlikely to arise unless publication would cause a high 
degree of offence and thus of harm to a reasonable person. But I can envisage 
circumstances where it may be unduly restrictive to require offence and harm 
at that high level …37
He continued that regardless of whether it forms part of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test or operates as a separate test, any “qualifier” 
used to determine whether something is private should be a “substantial 
level of offence” rather than a high level of offence. The former, he said, 
was “more flexible, while at the same time capturing the essence of the 
matter”.38
Other judges — including members of the New Zealand Supreme 
Court — have also questioned the status of Gault and Blanchard JJ’s test, 
particularly the desirability of the highly offensive publicity requirement. 
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 255.
36. Ibid at para 256.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
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In the Supreme Court decision of Rogers v Television New Zealand,39 two 
of their Honours applied Gault and Blanchard JJ’s test but expressly 
declined to approve it.40 Chief Justice Elias, with whom Justice Anderson 
concurred, also said that the Court should “reserve its position on the 
view … that the tort of privacy requires not only a reasonable expectation 
of privacy but also that publicity would be ‘highly offensive’”, noting 
that the test had been “doubted” by members of the House of Lords in 
the leading English decision of Campbell.41 Similar reservations can be 
gleaned from the judgment of President Young in the Court of Appeal 
decision in Rogers. Echoing Tipping J in Hosking, he said:
These two elements are interconnected. In most cases it will be the defeating 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy which makes publication objectionable, 
and likewise if publicity could fairly be seen as objectionable that might well 
suggest that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the 
information in question. For present purposes, however, I propose to focus on 
the first of these two requirements.42 
These observations also reflect concerns raised by numerous commentators 
about the impact of the high offensiveness test on the New Zealand privacy 
39. [2007] NZSC 91. 
40. Ibid at para 99, per McGrath J at para 144, per Anderson J at para 46, 
per Blanchard J at para 61, and per Tipping J (who decided the case on a 
different basis altogether).
41. Ibid at para 25. (Anderson J said that he “share[d] the concern expressed 
by the Chief Justice that the jurisprudence of [Hosking] should not be 
regarded as settled” at para 144.)
42. Television New Zealand Ltd (TVNZ) v Rogers, [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) 
at para 122 [Rogers CA].
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torts.43 Tom McKenzie, for example, argues that “the offensiveness test 
does little analytical work and fails to protect the plaintiff’s dignity and 
should, therefore, be abandoned”.44
Finally, it should be observed that English courts’ support for the 
high offensiveness test was perhaps not as strong as Gault and Blanchard 
JJ suggested in Hosking. In their discussion of English developments, 
Gault and Blanchard JJ said that in contrast to breach of confidence 
(which they said focused on confidential information and did not require 
a disclosure to be offensive), the emerging English privacy action gave 
a right of action for the publication of personal information absent 
an obligation of confidence “but only where that publication is or is 
likely to be highly offensive to a reasonable person”.45 They continued 
that in developing this high offensiveness requirement, English courts 
had drawn upon the US publicity tort. This was because the English 
Court of Appeal in Campbell had referred with approval to Gleeson CJ’s 
dicta in Lenah which in turn “comes directly from the American privacy 
43. See e.g. Lisa Tat, “Plaintiff Culpability and the New Zealand Tort of 
Invasion of Privacy” (2008) 39:2 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 365 at 379–80; Chris Hunt, “Breach of Privacy as a Tort” (2014) 
1:1 New Zealand Law Journal 286; Chris Hunt, “New Zealand’s New 
Privacy Tort in Comparative Perspective” (2013) 13:1 Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 157 at 163–65 [Hunt, “New Privacy 
Tort”]; Jennifer Moore, “Traumatised Bodies: Towards Corporeality in 
New Zealand’s Privacy Tort Law Involving Accident Survivors” (2011) 
24:3 New Zealand Universities Law Review 387 at 402–05; Tim Bain, 
“The Wrong Tort in the Right Place: Avenues for the Development of 
Civil Privacy Protections in New Zealand” (2016) 27:2 New Zealand 
Universities Law Review 295 at 304–05; N A Moreham, “Why is Privacy 
Important? Privacy, Dignity and the Development of the New Zealand 
Breach of Privacy Tort” in Jeremy Finn & Stephen Todd, eds, Law, Liberty 
and Legislation (Wellington, NZ: LexisNexis, 2008) 231 at 239 et seq; N 
A Moreham, “Recognising privacy in England and New Zealand” (2004) 
63:3 Cambridge Law Journal 527 at 555–58.
44. Thomas Levy McKenzie, “The New Intrusion Tort: The News Media 
Exposed?” (2014) 45:1 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 79 
at 95.
45. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 42.
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jurisprudence”.46 This conclusion influenced Gault and Blanchard JJ’s 
adoption of the high offensiveness test. Just before setting out their own 
version of the two-part privacy test, they said that its requirements were 
“a logical development of the attributes identified in the United States 
jurisprudence and adverted to in judgments in the British cases”.47
All of these conclusions seem to have been based on the fact that 
the high offensiveness test had been applied by the English Court of 
Appeal in Campbell in 2002. But the Court’s approach in that case was 
inconsistent with another leading English Court of Appeal decision, A 
v B Plc,48 in which Lord Woolf CJ identified the plaintiff’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy as the gravamen of liability and did not adopt a 
highly offensive requirement at all.49 Further, in one of the pre-Hosking 
iterations of Douglas v Hello! Ltd litigation,50 Justice Lindsay had declined 
to rely on the high offensiveness test developed in Campbell CA51 to 
determine whether surreptitiously taken photographs of the plaintiffs’ 
wedding reception should be regarded as confidential. He noted in doing 
so that Gleeson CJ’s dictum “does not even purport to be an exclusive 
definition of what is private”.52
It is unsurprising, then, that just two months after the Hosking case 
46. Ibid at para 43.
47. Ibid at para 117.
48. [2002] EWCA Civ 337.
49. Ibid at para 11ix-x. (Although the Court in A v B Plc cited the passage 
in which Gleeson CJ expresses support for the high offensiveness 
test in Lenah, supra note 8, this was simply to show “the difficulty of 
distinguishing between public and private information” and not to 
endorse the high offensive test as a means of determining what is private 
at para 11vii.)
50. [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch) [Douglas]. (This litigation concerned the 
publication of unauthorised photographs of the wedding of celebrity 
actors, Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones.) 
51. Campbell CA, supra, note 16.
52. Douglas, supra note 50 at paras 188–92. (He continues that the fact that 
“matters the disclosure of which would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities may, on that account, be regarded 
as private does not, of itself, suggest that no other matters can be so 
regarded” at para 191.)
13(2018) 4 CJCCL
was decided, the high offensiveness requirement was rejected by the House 
of Lords in Campbell in favour of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test. The majority also overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for publication of the details of 
her drug addiction treatment and photographs of her leaving a Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting. In what has emerged as the leading judgment in 
that decision, Lord Nicholls said that “the touchstone of private life is 
whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy” and that the high offensiveness test 
had no place in it.53 Baroness Hale agreed. Lord Carswell concurred with 
the judgments of both Baroness Hale and Lord Hope (who was in favour 
of relying on a “substantial” offensiveness test in cases where whether the 
information is public or private is not “obvious”)54 but decided the case 
on the basis of the intimate nature of the information, making it “not 
necessary” to consider the high offensiveness part of the test.55 This led 
the English Court of Appeal to say in Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH 
Prince of Wales56 that Gault and Blanchard JJ’s claim in Hosking that a 
plaintiff could only recover under the English privacy tort if publication 
is or was likely to be highly offensive to a reasonable person did not reflect 
the law as it stood in 2006.57 It is perhaps also questionable whether it 
was a sufficiently fulsome articulation of the law as it stood in 2004.
The failure to recognise the alternative test in A v B Plc (and the 
subsequent adoption of that test by the House of Lords in Campbell) 
reduces the weight that should be given to Gault and Blanchard JJ’s 
decision to include it in the New Zealand privacy tort. It not only 
means that an important alternative approach (i.e. one based principally 
on reasonable expectations of privacy) was not considered in Hosking 
but that consistency with English law — which Gault and Blanchard 
JJ themselves regarded as desirable — was not achieved. In those 
circumstances, it is regrettable that greater consideration was not given 
53. Campbell HL, supra note 3 at para 21.
54. Ibid at para 92.
55. Ibid at para 166.
56. [2006] EWCA Civ 1776.
57. Ibid at para 65.
14 
 
Moreham, Abandoning the “High Offensiveness” Privacy Test
to the significant constitutional and cultural differences between New 
Zealand and the United States, particularly in respect of the protection 
of freedom of expression.
IV. Why The High Offensiveness Test Should Be 
Abandoned
All these reservations about the high offensiveness test are, it is suggested, 
rightly held. Indeed, this section will set out three main reasons why New 
Zealand courts should abandon it. First, the absence of clear principle 
about the operation of the high offensiveness test makes it unacceptably 
unpredictable. Second, when courts have set out principles to guide 
the application of the test, they have taken too narrow a view of the 
harm caused by privacy breaches. This in turn obfuscates the dignity and 
autonomy interests at the heart of the privacy action. Third, all of the 
tools needed to exclude unmeritorious claims are already available under 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test. The high offensiveness test is 
therefore unnecessary.
A. Lack of Principle in the Application of the High 
Offensiveness Test
The first problem with the New Zealand high offensiveness test is the 
lack of clear principle in the jurisprudence about how it should be 
applied. In fact, in some cases, the question of whether the intrusion 
or publicity is highly offensive is disposed of with no reasoning at all. 
For example, in the strike-out decision in Henderson v Slevin,58 Associate 
Justice Osborne gave no reasons for his conclusion that a reasonable 
person would not think it highly offensive for a liquidator to pass on the 
plaintiff’s computer records to an enforcement unit nor to examine them 
himself.59 He just said that the requirement was not satisfied. Similarly, in 
declining an application for an interim injunction in Clague v APN News 
and Media Ltd,60 Justice Toogood gave no reasons for his conclusion that, 
58. [2015] NZHC 366.
59. Ibid at paras 48, 71.
60. [2012] NZHC 2898.
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although it would be embarrassing to the plaintiff and distressing to the 
plaintiff and his family, he was not persuaded that publicity around a 
police investigation into allegations of domestic assault would be highly 
offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.61
In other cases, courts have set out potentially useful principles for the 
application of the high offensiveness test but then failed clearly to apply 
them to the facts, instead treating the matter as a question of judicial 
instinct. For example, when determining whether the high offensiveness 
test was met on the facts in Hosking, Gault and Blanchard JJ simply said 
that:
We are not convinced a person of ordinary sensibilities would find the 
publication of these photographs highly offensive or objectionable even 
bearing in mind that young children are involved. … The real issue is whether 
publicising the content of the photographs (or the ‘fact’ that is being given 
publicity) would be offensive to the ordinary person. We cannot see any real 
harm in it.62
There is nothing in their discussion to explain why the proposed 
publication was insufficiently harmful — was it, for example, because the 
children were unaware of it, because they were too young to suffer distress, 
or because the information in the photograph had already been held not 
to be private? The leading intrusion case, Holland, is similar. Whata J 
begins the judgment by usefully saying that the offensiveness element is “a 
question of fact according to social conventions or expectations”63 and by 
citing a passage identifying “various factors” which will bear on whether 
an intrusion is “highly offensive” including “the degree of intrusion, 
context, conduct and circumstances of the intrusion, the motive and 
objectives of the intruder and the expectations of those whose privacy is 
invaded”.64 But when it comes to applying the high offensiveness test, he 
does not apply those factors systematically to the facts. Rather, he simply 
says that the defendant’s act of filming the plaintiff in the shower was 
61. Ibid at para 38.
62. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 165.
63. Holland, supra note 24 at para 16.
64. Ibid citing Miller v National Broadcasting Co, 187 Cal App (3d) 1463 (Cal 
Ct App (US) 1986) at 1483 [Miller] and citing Jones, supra note 30 at 
para 58. 
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offensive without saying why.65
Faesenkleot v Jenkin is an exception to this trend. In that case, the 
plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent his neighbour, with whom he 
was already engaged in an acrimonious dispute, from filming people using 
the plaintiff’s driveway. Justice Asher expressly identifies and applies the 
principle that a deliberate intrusion which was designed to offend the 
plaintiff “might be more offensive than one which is obviously accidental 
and incidental to another purpose”,66 concluding that the camera in that 
case was not installed with the purpose of offending the plaintiff.67 He 
also said that the greater the expectation of privacy interfered with by the 
intrusion, “the more likely an intrusion will be offensive”,68 concluding 
that the surveillance was not offensive because the area surveyed was not 
large nor used for any intimate purpose, the camera did not film the 
plaintiff’s home or garden, and because cars and pedestrians could still use 
the driveway without being caught by the camera.69 Although this more 
detailed reasoning is welcome, the broad principles applied in this case 
still provide only limited guidance for future cases (especially since Asher 
J had already decided that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in respect of the filming (in part because the plaintiff was in fact 
65. Holland, ibid at para 99. (In a similar vein, in the pre-Hosking case of P 
v D, supra note 6, Nicholson J said that offensiveness has to be assessed 
from the perspective of a person of ordinary sensibilities “in the same 
position” as the plaintiff at para 39 and that courts should not take an 
idealistic view about societal attitudes to mental illness at para 37, but 
when it came to applying the law to the facts, he simply held that he 
accepted that the plaintiff had the “stated feelings” and that “a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities would in the circumstances also find 
publication of information that they had been a patient in a psychiatric 
hospital highly offensive” at para 39.)
66. Faesenkloet, supra note 23 at para 47.
67. Ibid at paras 47–49.
68. Ibid at para 50.
69. Ibid. (Asher J concluded that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in respect of the filming for similar reasons at paras 
44–45.)
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able to evade the camera’s gaze altogether)).70
The general paucity of reasoning about the application of the 
high offensiveness test makes its operation unpredictable. Although 
a test appealing to a judge’s instincts might be useful for disposing of 
unmeritorious cases once they come to court, it does not delineate the 
boundaries of the privacy torts clearly. This in turn makes it difficult for 
people — including those seeking to publish information, investigate 
wrongdoing or advise clients wanting to do these things — to know exactly 
what the law does and does not proscribe. This level of uncertainty is 
undesirable. Although privacy actions need to retain a degree of flexibility 
to reflect legitimate differences in the degree of inaccessibility that each 
individual seeks, they do not need to be imprecise or unpredictable. 
Indeed, given that the action has the potential to stymie freedom of 
expression and prevent legitimate investigation of wrongdoing, it is 
important that they are not. The application of the high offensiveness test 
requires more, then, than a general conclusion at the end of the judgment 
about whether or not the judge in a particular instance thought that the 
behaviour was offensive.
It is important to note at this point that this lack of clear reasoning in 
the New Zealand privacy case law is a particular feature of the application 
of the high offensiveness part of the privacy tests. The principles 
governing the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
are, in contrast, much better articulated.71 As outlined above, when it 
comes to applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test in Hosking, 
Gault and Blanchard JJ explain that information about health, personal 
relationships, and finances “may be easy to identify as private” and that 
reasonable expectations of privacy depend on what people applying 
“contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to 
70. Ibid at para 50.
71. It should be noted that there is also still uncertainty about the scope of 
the requirement in Holland that the plaintiff establish an “intentional 
and unauthorised intrusion” into “seclusion (namely intimate personal 
activity, space or affairs)” in the intrusion tort. See further N A Moreham, 
“A Conceptual Framework for the New Zealand Tort of Intrusion” (2016) 
47:2 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 283.
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be meant to be unobserved”.72 They also discussed in some detail the 
impact that a plaintiff’s location and public profile — including that of 
involuntary public figures, like the children at issue in that case — would 
have on his or her reasonable expectations of privacy.73
The factors which bear on the application of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test are even better articulated in England and 
Wales. In the influential judgment of the Court of Appeal in Murray v 
Express Newspapers Plc,74 Sir Anthony Clarke MR said (in the course of 
holding that the young son of well-known author J K Rowling could 
restrain the defendants from publishing photographs taken of him on the 
public street during a family trip to a café):
As we see it, the question whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
is a broad one, which takes account of all the circumstances of the case. They 
include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the 
plaintiff was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and 
purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known 
or could be inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in 
which and the purposes for which the information came into the hands of the 
publisher.75
These factors were systematically applied in Murray itself and have been 
adopted in numerous first instance and appellate judgments since.76 This 
has in turn led to the emergence of identifiable principles governing 
the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Indeed, 
this author has argued elsewhere that it is now possible to identify from 
within English law both high-level principles governing the application 
of the reasonable expectation of privacy test and specific categories of 
72. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 119 citing Lenah, supra note 8 at para 42.
73. Ibid at paras 120–24.
74. [2008] EWCA Civ 446 [Murray]. 
75. Ibid at para 36. (The Court also expressly rejected the Hosking court’s 
approach to the children of public figures on the basis that it put too little 
weight on the children’s separate privacy interests at para 51.)
76. See e.g. Weller v Associated Press Ltd, [2015] EWCA Civ 1176 at para 16; 
Re JR38, [2015] UKSC 42 at para 98.
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information that are likely to satisfy it.77 The reasonable expectation of 
privacy test is therefore applied in a much more principled way than the 
high offensiveness test.
B. Taking Too Narrow a View of Privacy Harms 
One notable exception to the lack of principle in the application of the 
high offensiveness test in New Zealand is the approach taken in Andrews 
v Television New Zealand.78 Regrettably, however, that case is problematic 
for other reasons.
Andrews concerned a reality television programme which showed in 
considerable detail the two plaintiffs being extricated from a car wreck 
on the side of the road late one night. The footage included intimate 
conversations between the couple including exchanges in which Mrs 
Andrews told her injured husband that she loved him and asked him to 
“stay with her”. The couple were not informed of the filming; instead, 
they first learnt of it some months later when the programme appeared 
on television during a party at a neighbour’s house.
In his decision rejecting the couple’s claim for damages, Justice 
Allan accepted that the couple had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
respect of the broadcast of intimate conversations between them but said 
77. See further N A Moreham, “Unpacking The Reasonable Expectation 
Of Privacy Test” 134 Law Quarterly Review [forthcoming in 2018] 
[Moreham, “Unpacking”]. (This article argues that under the first of 
the two high-level principles, courts consider whether recognition of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy is consistent with societal attitudes 
to the information or activity and under the second, they ask whether 
the plaintiff relied on socially-recognised signals to show that he or 
she regarded the information or activity as private. Categories of 
information or activity which society will usually regard as private include 
matters relating to the appearance or workings of the physical body, to 
sexual encounters or activity, to the intimate details of one’s personal 
relationships, and the intimacies of one’s family and/or domestic life.)
78. Andrews, supra note 23. 
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that the broadcast was not highly offensive.79 In reaching that conclusion, 
he focused on the tone of the publicity. He held that:
There may be instances where the disclosure of otherwise relatively inoffensive 
facts may become offensive by reason of the extent and tone of a publication. 
So the manner of disclosure is a relevant consideration.80
Later in the judgment, Allan J said that there was nothing in the 
programme which showed the couple in “a bad light”.81 He said that 
neither plaintiff was able to point to anything about the programme 
which they regarded as humiliating, embarrassing, or offensive and 
noted that it had not made mention of the fact that both plaintiffs had 
excess blood alcohol levels at the time of the accident.82 Mrs Andrews 
had accepted, he said, that she was portrayed as “a caring person, very 
much concerned about her husband’s wellbeing” and “coping well by 
making light of the situation” and that nothing which she had said to her 
husband could be regarded as humiliating or embarrassing to either of 
them.83 Although Allan J said that the absence of inherently embarrassing 
material “does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the disclosure 
was not humiliating and distressful”,84 it therefore clearly had a significant 
bearing on his disposal of the case.
This approach, with respect, misses the point. The publicity tort is 
not about protection from reputational harm or embarrassment but the 
preservation of choice about when the private aspects of one’s life will 
be accessible to others. This, as widely recognised by commentators and 
79. Ibid at para 100. (Allan J also held that had the plaintiffs established that 
the footage had breached their privacy, it would have been outweighed by 
a legitimate public concern in the activities of emergency services at para 
91.)
80. Ibid at para 51.
81. Ibid at para 67.
82. Ibid at para 67. (They had both escaped conviction for drunk driving 
because the police were unable to establish which of them had been 
driving.)
83. Ibid at para 68.
84. Ibid at para 69. 
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judges, is a fundamental aspect of individual dignity and autonomy.85 
The complaint in Andrews is therefore not that the footage made the 
couple look bad but that someone else decided that the world should 
see and hear them during that traumatic rescue. This is humiliating and 
distressful in itself regardless of the tone of the documentary.86 Other 
examples drive home that point. Is it really alright, for example, to 
broadcast surreptitiously obtained footage of a father comforting his 
dying child in hospital because it makes him look like a caring person? 
And what say there is widespread agreement that the plaintiff looks great 
in naked photographs that her ex-boyfriend put up on the internet? 
Clearly that does not mean that they are no longer humiliating. The 
objection in these situations is that it should be the subjects themselves 
— not the defendants — determining whether these intimate matters are 
shown. By suggesting that the unwanted broadcast of detailed footage 
of the event has to be in some way negative or embarrassing, Andrews 
therefore obfuscates what the privacy action is really about.
It should also be noted that Allan J’s conclusion runs contrary to 
an increasing body of evidence showing the harm caused by unwanted 
exposure at intimate or traumatic times, even if the coverage is positive. 
For example, friends and family members of the men who died in the 
Pike River mine disaster in 2011 have said that intense media intrusion 
85. See e.g. Edward J Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: 
An Answer to Dean Prosser” (1964) 39:6 New York University Law 
Review 962; Stanley Benn, “Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons” in 
James Roland Pennock & John W Chapman, eds, Privacy, NOMOS XIII 
(New York: Atherton Press, 1971) 1; David Feldman, “Secrecy, Dignity 
or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty” (1994) 47:2 Current 
Legal Problems 41; Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of the Law” 
(1980) 89:3 Yale Law Journal 421; Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom 
(New York: Antheneum, 1967); Pavesich v New England Life Insurance 
Co, 50 SE 68 at 70 (Sup Ct Ga (US) 1905); Hosking, supra note 4 at 
para 239, per Tipping J; Campbell HL, supra note 3 at para 50, per Lord 
Hoffman.
86. See generally Catlin Wilson & Daniel Nilsson, “Protecting Our Personal 
Sphere” (2013) 1:1 New Zealand Law Journal 8 at 9–10; Tat, supra note 
43 at 379; Moreham, “Why is Privacy”, supra note 43 at 240–43.
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in the days following the explosion left them feeling “violated”, physically 
unsafe, and commodified.87 The fact that the coverage was sympathetic 
did not alter the strength of any of these reactions.
In Andrews, Allan J was of the view that Gault and Blanchard JJ’s 
decision in Hosking required him to take this narrow, tone-focused 
approach to the highly offensive requirement. He said, when dismissing 
Tipping J’s view in Hosking that the reasonable expectation and high 
offensiveness requirements would “be likely to coalesce”,88 that it was 
important to bear in mind “as a matter of analysis at a practical level that 
the ‘highly offensive’ test relates to publicity” and is therefore not part of 
the test of whether information is private.89 The court “does not reach 
the stage of considering the highly offensive test unless and until it has 
concluded that what has been disclosed was private information”.90 In his 
view, then, the focus on the nature of the publicity flowed from Gault 
and Blanchard JJ’s formulation of the privacy test.
The highly offensive publicity test does certainly point away from 
the conclusion — which the English Court of Appeal recently reached 
in Gulati v MGN Ltd91 — that breach of privacy without more can cause 
compensable harm. Rather, its inclusion implies that even if the breach 
of privacy is sufficiently serious to be regarded as socially unacceptable 
(as the reasonable expectation of privacy test requires) it still might not 
cause real humiliation, distress, or other harm to the plaintiff. Something 
more, it says, is needed. The test therefore obscures the fact that all 
privacy interferences “humiliate” their subjects — and undermine their 
dignity and autonomy — by shifting control over something personal to 
87. N A Moreham & Yvette Tinsley, “Media Intrusion into Grief: Lessons 
from the Pike River Mining Disaster” in Andrew T Kenyon, ed, 
Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) 115 at 127 [Moreham & Tinsley, “Media 
Intrusion into Grief”].
88. Andrews, supra note 23 at para 25 (citing Hosking, supra note 4 at para 
256).
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. [2015] EWCA Civ 1291. (Substantial damages were awarded in that case 
for the loss of privacy itself even in the absence of distress or other harm.)
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the subject to someone other than the subject.92
This obfuscation is exacerbated by the fact that the high offensiveness 
element of Gault and Blanchard JJ’s test requires the plaintiff to show 
that the publicity would cause a reasonable person “offence”. The word 
“offensive” is usually used to refer to something which is insulting or 
denigrating in some way — an opinion which is racist or sexist, for 
example. This is not the language of privacy. In privacy situations, people 
use the language of dignity and autonomy: “violation”, lack of respect, 
commodification.93 The word “offensiveness” therefore distracts from the 
interests at the core of the privacy right.
All this makes it less surprising that the judge in Andrews focused on 
the lack of denigration or criticism in the broadcast of the couple rather 
than the humiliation inherent in it. It also suggests that at the very least 
the high offensiveness test should be reformulated to reflect Gault and 
Blanchard JJ’s actual concern in Hosking, namely that the publicity be 
“truly humiliating and distressful”94 to an objective, reasonable person.95 
92. Hyman Gross, “Privacy and Autonomy” in James Roland Pennock 
& John W Chapman, eds, NOMOS XIII (New York: Atherton Press, 
1971) 169 at 169, 177. (He continues that public disclosures of private 
facts always result in the individual being shamed, not because of what 
others learn about him or her, but because someone other than the 
victim is determining what will be done with what is learnt at 177.) In 
Hosking, supra note 4 at para 125 Gault and Blanchard JJ also implicitly 
acknowledge this by saying that “[i]n theory a rights-based cause of 
action would be made out by proof of breach of the right irrespective of 
the seriousness breach” (but they go on to say that such an approach is 
unrealistic and that the high offensiveness test is therefore needed at para 
127).
93. Moreham & Tinsley, “Media Intrusion into Grief”, supra note 87; UK, 
The Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics 
of the Press: Report, by The Right Honourable Lord Justice Leveson, vol 
2 (London: The Stationery Office, 2012) at 504 para 3.2, 540 paras 
1.7, 1.10, 548 para 3.4, 553 para 3.27, 602 para 2.44 (where Sir Brian 
Leveson spoke of individual lives being treated like “commodities” by the 
media).
94. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 126.
95. Ibid at para 117.
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But even given its current formulation, Allan J’s application of the high 
offensiveness test in Andrews is too narrow. Although Gault and Blanchard 
JJ argued in Hosking that the high offensiveness test was necessary to 
exclude non-serious claims from the reach of the action, neither suggested 
that the “tone” of the publicity would determine whether it was satisfied. 
Rather, they focused on whether the publicity was widespread and would 
cause a reasonable plaintiff distress. And, contrary to Allan J’s suggestion, 
Tipping J’s point in Hosking (echoed by Young P in Rogers CA)96 about 
the reasonable expectation of privacy and high offensiveness tests usually 
coalescing can be reconciled with the view that it is the publicity which 
has to be offensive. What Tipping J and Young P said in those cases is that 
offensiveness — whether it is of the publicity or anything else — should 
inevitably follow interference with a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The second reason why Allan J concluded that the high offensiveness 
test was not satisfied in Andrews was that that the couple did not get upset 
about the right thing in the right way. Allan J said that, as the evidence 
unfolded, it emerged that “it was not the intrusion on the plaintiffs’ 
privacy which lay at the heart of the proceeding” but rather their “chagrin 
and annoyance” at not being told about the filming or the broadcast.97 
“Even more” important was the fact that the plaintiffs were given no 
prior notice of the date of the broadcast and as a result found themselves 
watching the broadcast for the first time in the company of strangers.98 
But all this, says Allan J, is immaterial because “a failure to obtain consent 
prior to publication is not an ingredient of the tort of breach of privacy”.99 
Further, consent is not normally sought by broadcasters if the filming 
takes place in public view.100 It followed, he said, that given that neither 
plaintiff found the broadcast of conversations at the accident scene as 
highly offensive, it was impossible to conclude that a reasonable person 
96. Rogers CA, supra note 42. 
97. Andrews, supra note 23 at para 69.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid at para 70.
100. Ibid.
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in the shoes of the plaintiffs would do so.101
This reasoning is, with respect, difficult to follow. First, considering 
whether broadcasters normally seek consent before broadcasting footage 
of something which was in public view begs the very question the 
proceedings were designed to answer.  The whole point of this case is to 
determine whether broadcasters should be entitled to publish footage of 
this nature without informing or asking its subjects.102  What the media 
usually do should not be determinative of this matter. Further, contrary 
to Allan J’s contention, questions of choice and consent are central to 
the right to privacy including in the tort of giving publicity to private 
facts. As Tipping J said in Hosking, privacy is all about “the right to have 
people leave you alone if you do not want some aspect of your private life 
to become public property … that some aspects of people’s lives should 
be able to remain private if they so wish”.103 Consent — or lack thereof 
— plainly lies at the heart of these ideas of “wanting”, “wishing”, and 
“choosing”. The fact that the plaintiffs were upset that their consent was 
not sought is therefore entirely relevant to their claim.
Third, it is difficult to see why the plaintiffs’ “chagrin and annoyance” 
were not enough to satisfy the requirement that the privacy interference 
causes real humiliation, distress, or other harm. It is clear from Allan 
J’s own findings of fact that the plaintiffs were deeply affected by the 
defendant’s conduct. He held that: 
The plaintiffs were greatly distressed by the screening of the programme. They 
had no warning of it. The accident had given rise to tensions within the family, 
particularly in the relationship between the plaintiffs themselves and in respect 
of the emotional health of one of their children. They were forced to re-live 
the trauma of the accident, as they saw the scene from an entirely different 
viewpoint. Moreover, all of this occurred while in the company of a number of 
other people, not all of whom were known to them.104
101. Ibid at para 71. (Even on its face, this statement is questionable. If the 
highly offensive publicity test is truly objective, then a plaintiff’s unusually 
thick skin about a privacy intrusion should be no more relevant that 
another plaintiff’s thin one.)
102. Ibid at para 70.
103. Hosking, supra note 4 at paras 238–39.
104. Andrews, supra note 23 at para 15.
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This is exactly the kind of distress and consequential harm that was 
described by Gault and Blanchard JJ in Hosking.105 People experience 
a range of emotions at having their privacy interfered with including 
“chagrin and annoyance”. It is not at all clear why only certain of these 
negative emotions should satisfy the high offensiveness test.
It is unsurprising in light of all this that Andrews has been the subject 
of much academic criticism.106 Not only did it deny a remedy to the 
meritorious (albeit perhaps unsympathetic) plaintiffs in that case, it 
misinterpreted the nature of privacy harms and provided a carte blanche 
for voyeurs and media companies to broadcast footage of victims at will. 
The decision in Andrews sets the bar for recovery both too high and in the 
wrong place. By doing so, it fortifies arguments for abandoning the high 
offensiveness test itself.
C. The High Offensiveness Test is Unnecessary 
This leads to the final reason for abandoning the high offensiveness test — 
it is unnecessary. It will be recalled that in Hosking, Gault and Blanchard 
JJ said that they included the high offensiveness requirement because they 
believed that it is necessary to keep the action within bounds. It is “quite 
unrealistic”, they said, to contemplate legal liability for all publications 
of private information: it would be “absurd”, for example, “to consider 
actionable merely informing a neighbour that one’s spouse has a cold”.107 
This is not doubted. Privacy torts have the potential both to silence 
legitimate speech and to deter the desirable investigation of wrongdoing. 
They therefore need to be kept within clearly defined parameters. Courts 
do not, however, need to rely on the high offensiveness test to do this. 
105. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 126. (Indeed, since, as discussed above, 
“offence” imports an idea of denigration or insult, “chagrin and 
annoyance” seem to fit particularly comfortably within the concept.)
106. See Moore, supra note 43 at 402–05; McKenzie, supra note 44 at 95–97; 
Ursula Cheer, “The Future of Privacy: Recent Legal Developments New 
Zealand” (2007) 13:2 Canterbury Law Review 169 at 183–85; Bain, 
supra note 43 at 319–22; Tat, supra note 43 at 379–80; Moreham, “Why 
is Privacy”, supra note 43 at 240–43.
107. Hosking, supra note 4 at para 125.
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This is because unmeritorious claims are already excluded from the 
privacy tort through the proper operation of the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test.
All three of the majority judges in Hosking made it clear that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test will not be satisfied unless the 
plaintiff’s privacy expectations accord with general societal standards. 
As Tipping J says, the word “reasonableness” plainly imports into the 
privacy tort an enquiry into “contemporary societal values” in respect 
of the matter at hand.108 Gault and Blanchard JJ also approved of 
Gleeson CJ’s observation in Lenah that “contemporary standards of 
morals and behaviour” determine what is and is not private109 and in 
Holland, Whata J stressed (citing the Californian Supreme Court case of 
Shulman v Group W Productions) that in order to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the plaintiff must show both that he or she had a 
subjective expectation of solitude or seclusion and that that expectation 
was “objectively reasonable”.110 All this means that whether a plaintiff 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a normative enquiry into what 
privacy protection a plaintiff can expect the law to provide.111 Once this 
is recognised, it becomes plain that it will not be satisfied unless the 
interference in question is a serious one. The plaintiff has to show that 
normal everyday people would share their view that the information or 
activity is private and should be legally protected. This will not be the 
case if your spouse tells your neighbour — or anyone else for that matter 
— that you have a cold.
The superfluousness of the high offensiveness test is reinforced 
when one considers the factors which Whata J identified in Holland 
as relevant to the application of the high offensiveness test. It will be 
recalled that in Holland, Whata J (drawing on Jones v Tsige and Miller v 
National Broadcasting Co) said that “various factors” will bear on whether 
an intrusion is “highly offensive” including “the degree of intrusion, 
108. Ibid at para 250.
109. Ibid at para 119 citing Lenah, supra note 8 at para 42.
110. Holland, supra note 24 at para 17 citing, inter alia, Shulman, supra note 
30 at para 490.
111. See further, Moreham, “Unpacking”, supra note 77.
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context, conduct and circumstances of the intrusion, the motive and 
objectives of the intruder and the expectations of those whose privacy 
is invaded”.112 But these factors have all also been identified by the 
English Court of Appeal in Murray as relevant to the application of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test (noting that English and New 
Zealand law are very similar in this regard).113 In fact, there is complete 
overlap between the two tests. To take the elements one-by-one, the 
Holland enquiries into the “degree”, “conduct”, and “circumstances”114 of 
the intrusion align with the Murray enquiry into “the nature and purpose 
of the intrusion”,115 the Holland enquiry into “context”116 aligns with the 
Murray court’s consideration of the attributes of the plaintiffs, the nature 
of the activity which they were engaged, the place at which the relevant 
activity was happening, the absence of consent and the circumstances in 
which the information came into the publisher,117 Holland’s concern with 
“the motives and objectives of the intruder”118 is covered by the Murray 
enquiry into “the purposes for which the information came into the 
hands of the publisher”,119 and finally, the concern in Holland with the 
“expectations of those whose privacy is invaded”120 plainly overlaps with 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test itself. It is difficult to see, then, 
what tools the high offensiveness test is providing that are not already 
part of the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
It should be recalled at this point that English courts determine 
privacy claims simply by applying a reasonable expectation of privacy test 
and a public interest defence. The high offensiveness test was expressly 
rejected by the House of Lords in Campbell. In that case, Baroness Hale 
112. Holland, supra note 24 at para 16 citing Miller, supra note 64 at 1483 and 
Jones, supra note 30 at para 58.
113. For discussion of the factors which the Hosking majority regarded as 
relevant to the reasonable expectation of privacy test see Part II. 
114. Holland, supra note 24 at para 16.
115. Murray, supra note 74 at para 36.
116. Holland, supra note 24 at para 16.
117. Murray, supra note 74 at para 36.
118. Holland, supra note 24 at para 16.
119. Murray, supra note 74 at para 36. 
120. Holland, supra note 24 at para 16.
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held that “an objective reasonable expectation test is much simpler and 
clearer” than one which asks whether “disclosure or observation would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities”.121 Lord 
Nicholls agreed saying that the “highly offensive” phrase was “suggestive 
of a stricter test of private information than a reasonable expectation of 
privacy” and second, that it can:
all too easily bring into account, when deciding whether the disclosed 
information was private, considerations which go more properly to issues of 
proportionality; for instance, the degree of intrusion into private life, and the 
extent to which the publication was a matter of proper public concern.122
Reinforcing all this, the English Court of Appeal recently held that the 
first instance judge in a judicial review decision was wrong to apply Lord 
Hope’s high offensiveness test to determine whether information about 
the plaintiffs’ indebtedness to the National Health Service was private 
and confidential at common law. Lord Neuberger MR said, speaking 
for the Court in W, X, Y and Z v Secretary of State for Health,123 that “in 
so far as the judge regarded ‘highly offensive’ formulation as material to 
whether the information was private and confidential, he was wrong to 
do so”.124
V. Conclusion
If English courts can rely solely on the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test and legitimate public concern defence to dispose of the 
dozens of privacy cases which come before them each year, the New 
Zealand courts can too. Such an approach would move New Zealand 
courts away from reliance on the imprecise and often value-laden high 
offensiveness requirement and onto an element which is increasingly the 
subject of detailed and principled reasoning both in New Zealand and 
abroad. Unmeritorious claims can easily be dealt with on a reasonable 
expectations-based approach — non-serious cases will not satisfy the 
reasonableness test. Indeed, the need to deal with unmeritorious claims 
121. Campbell HL, supra note 3 at para 135 citing Lenah, supra note 8.
122. Campbell HL, ibid at para 22.
123. [2015] EWCA Civ 1034. 
124. Ibid at para 34. (The appeal was ultimately dismissed on other grounds.)
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under the reasonable expectation of privacy test would encourage the 
more nuanced development of that requirement in New Zealand law.
Whilst it is difficult to see what value the high offensiveness test 
adds to the New Zealand privacy torts, it is not difficult to see what it 
might be taking away. As discussed, lack of clarity about what is and is 
not offensive undermines the predictability of the New Zealand privacy 
actions as a whole. And the narrow types of harm which some courts (most 
notably the High Court in Andrews) say will cause “offence” obfuscates 
the interests in dignity and autonomy at the heart of the privacy action. 
The high bar set by the high offensiveness requirement also seems to 
have arrested the general development of the torts. In the 14 years since 
Hosking was decided, only four successful privacy claims have been 
brought in New Zealand.125 In contrast, courts in England and Wales 
have considered many dozens of cases and awarded relief to a wide range 
of plaintiffs. Some of these differences can be put down to the different 
context in which the torts are operating (including the larger number of 
celebrities living in the United Kingdom and the media’s strong appetite 
for stories about them) but there is every reason to think that the higher 
bar for recovery under the New Zealand torts (particularly under the 
high offensiveness test) is a factor.
125. See respectively, Holland, supra note 24; A v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd, 
[2011] NZHC 71 (in which it was held that the fact that the plaintiff had 
made a sex offence complaint was private); JJC v Fairfax New Zealand 
Ltd, HC Auckland CIV-2001-404-5605 (where the fact that the plaintiff 
was a child whose mother was allegedly murdered by his father was 
private); Brown, supra note 23 (police breached privacy by distributing 
a flier identifying the plaintiff (by full name and photograph) as a 
convicted paedophile living in the area). There were also three successful 
claims which predated Hosking: P v D, supra note 6 (in which a public 
figure obtained an injunction restraining publication of an article about 
his or her mental health); L v G, [2002] NZAR 495 (DC) (regarding 
non-consensual publication of an unidentifiable woman’s genitalia in an 
adult lifestyles magazine); Tucker, supra note 6 (regarding the proposed 
disclosure of the fact that a man seeking to raise funds for heart surgery 
was a convicted paedophile).
31(2018) 4 CJCCL
Many New Zealand judges have indicated a willingness to reconsider 
the formulation of the requirements of the privacy torts in an appropriate 
case. It is hoped that when the opportunity presents itself, the high 
offensiveness test will be abandoned.
